Duopoly Competition in Advertising-Sponsored Wi-Fi Provision
Advisor(s)
Haoran Yu, Northwestern University
Randall A. Berry, Northwestern University
Ermin Wei, Northwestern University
Location
Room A123
Start Date
26-4-2019 10:25 AM
End Date
26-4-2019 10:40 AM
Abstract
It has been increasingly popular for venues (e.g., restaurants) to collaborate with advertisers on the provision of public Wi-Fi services. The venues’ visitors can watch the advertisers’ ads in exchange for free Wi-Fi access, and the venue owners charge the advertisers for the ad display. In this work, we consider competition in advertising-sponsored Wi-Fi provision. Two venue owners with overlapping coverage compete for users and further sell the ad slots generated by the users to an advertiser. We model the strategic interactions among the venue owners, advertiser, and users as a three-stage game, and analyze the game equilibrium. Our results show that the venue owners’ advertising densities affect their market shares as well as the advertiser’s overall payment.
Duopoly Competition in Advertising-Sponsored Wi-Fi Provision
Room A123
It has been increasingly popular for venues (e.g., restaurants) to collaborate with advertisers on the provision of public Wi-Fi services. The venues’ visitors can watch the advertisers’ ads in exchange for free Wi-Fi access, and the venue owners charge the advertisers for the ad display. In this work, we consider competition in advertising-sponsored Wi-Fi provision. Two venue owners with overlapping coverage compete for users and further sell the ad slots generated by the users to an advertiser. We model the strategic interactions among the venue owners, advertiser, and users as a three-stage game, and analyze the game equilibrium. Our results show that the venue owners’ advertising densities affect their market shares as well as the advertiser’s overall payment.